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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
MUTATIONS IN STATES AND THEIR EFFECT UPON
INTERNATIONAL PERSONALITY
When the Peace of Westphalia (1648), ending the Thirty Years'
War, recognized and confirmed the independence of a multitude of
European States, the lingering political conception of world order as
a federation, tnder the dominion of Rome, disappeared. In its
place it was instinctively perceived that a community or s.z!'tty of
states constituted the new order; and upon the maxim ubi socieias
ubi jus, a system of law for the government of the society became
inevitable.
This society was not organized in the sense that agencies were
instituted through which its will might be made manifest; on the
contrary, the conception of state sovereignty as absolute power, sus-
ceptible to no earthly restraint, excluded the idea of accountability to
the society as a whole.
The law of this society, special and general, was to be found in
bilateral and multilateral treaties and conventions, and in custom
and usage. As to the rights and duties of states as members of the
society, they were vindicated not by common action but by states
directly interested, as occasions arose. Violations of law were viewed
as the concern of those states only directly suffering therefrom. It
was not until the last few decades that a violation of the law of
nations was conceived as an injury to all states in that it tended to
weaken the law instituted for the protection of all.
This attitude of the society of nations may be partly explained
by the variation in the character of its members in which autocracies
predominated. As has been aptly said by former Secretary Root,
autocracies can live without law; they proceed by commands; but
democracies cannot live without law, the law is the very breath of
life of a democracy. To an autocracy the law is an undesirable limi-
tation upon its otherwise unlimited powers. In any society in which
they were members, therefore, a readiness on their part to vindicate
the law was not to be expected.
Yet the liberalizing tendencies of the last century, in their effects
upon the internal structure of the states of the world, have resulted
in a corresponding international tendency to organization in the society
of nations. This movement has been accelerated during the last
two decades through the clarification and codification of law by inter-
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national conferences and the establishment of international organs,
such as those at The Hague. Until the outbreak of the Great War
the progress of the world was plainly toward the establishment of
international rights and duties upon the foundation of definite law and
a closer co-ordination of the members of the society of nations in
its maintenance.
This growth has at least been checked by the actions of the
Congress of Versailles and its proposal to organize society on a
basis of preponderant power rather than on one of law. In this
connection it may be pointed out that resolutions of the American
Society of International Law and of other bodies, urging the calling
of a general conference to meet after the peace, for the purpose of
reviewing the condition of international law and of agreeing upon
and stating in authoritative form the rules and principles thereof,
were ignored by the Congress.
The proposed League of Nations--if it is put into operation
unamended-will usher in a new world order, quite as unlike the pres-
ent as the present was unlike that existing prior to the Peace of West-
phalia. And yet there is a similarity between the system proposed
and that obtaining prior to 1648.
The organization of the world under Rome, in its later days,
bore the aspect of a loose federation; after the Peace of Westphalia
the aspect was that of an unrestrained democracy, dropping at times
into anarchy, but finally emerging toward liberty urder law; the pro-
posed organization bears some of the qualities of an international
aristocracy, dominated by the Great Powers, with their ideas of what
is good for the world substituted for a system of rights and duties
defined and enforced under universal law.
In the first article of the Covenant of the League a radical break
with the previous order occurs in the qualifications of merbership,
and the admission into the League of "any fully self-governing state,
dominion or colony." A dominion or colony may be fully self-
governing and still be dependent; in fact, most dominions and col-
onies are wholly without external sovereignty or the power to regu-
late their external or foreign affairs. Such a political entity was
ineligible to membership in the Society of Nations, and essentially
so, since the Society of Nations was a society of equals. If dependent
states are to be admitted to membership in the League of Nations, the
League necessarily becomes an association of unequals. If inde-
pendence is no longer to be a test equality cannot exist, since the very
absence of independence implies dependence upon another, thus multi-
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plying the power and position of that other by the number of nmber-
states dependent upon it.
It is inconceivable that the system proposed can last, even if
put into operation; its only chance of survival lies in the restoration
and restatement of the law, backed by an adequate sanction. The
character of the structure would thus be wholly changed.
The conpilation following is not prepared as a history of an age
that has gone, but as a summary of the law, as it has evolved from
the practice of nations, and as it must be held to exist today.
ESSENTIAL ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGN STATES.
Section 1. A state must possess certain essential attributes as
an international person, without which, although it might exist politi-
cally, it would not exist in contemplation of international law.
(Bry, No. 28; Bonfils, Nos. 160-162; 1 Calvo, sec. 39; Heffter, sec.
15: Pradier-Fodere, Nos. 69-81; 1 Moore, sec. 3.)
And there is substantial concurrence in the view that these essen-
tials to legal state existence, entitling a state to recognition as an inter-
national person, include:
(a) Definite territory;
(b) A people permanently organized for political purposes;
(c) A certain degree of civilization; and
(d) A certain degree of autonomy and independence.
If a state permanently lose any of these necessary elements it
loses title to recognition as an international person. But that the loss
must be permanent, and not merely the temporary result of accident,
to work a forfeiture of its status, is borne out in the consistent practice
of nations with respect to states in the throes of revolution or war.
CHANGES EFFECTING LOSS OF INTERNATIONAL ERSONALITY.
Sec. 2. A state may cease to exist as an international person from
one of any of the following causes:
1. If it permanently lose its territory, which may happen as an
incident:
(a) To conquest, coupled with annexation, cession or long con-
tinued possession;
(b) To voluntary incorporation into or union with another state;
or
(c) To division into several states.
2. If it permanently lose its people; as from total emigration or
the perishing of the whole population.
3. If it permanently lose its political organization; as from:
(a) Permanent anarchy, or
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(b). Total depopulation.
4. If it permanently lose its civilization; as from lapse into bar-
barism.
5. If it lose its autonomy and independence, or sovereignty
through the investment of the powers of sovereignty in another state
or states; which may happen as an incident:
(a) To voluntary or involuntary submission permanently to an-
other state;
(b) To incorporation into or union with another state;
(c) To division into several states.
Thus international personality may be lost (a) as a result of
the permanent loss of sovereignty-the supreme will of a society-
through voluntary or involuntary submission of that will to another;
or, (b) as a result of the permanent loss of a people in whom that will
inheres; or, (c) as a result of the permanent loss of a government
through which that will may be manifested; or, (d) as a result of the
loss of territory in respect of which that will may be exercised. (Hall,
7th ed., p. 22.)
LIMITATIONS ON SOVERIGNTY NOT AFFECTING IN'rRNATIONAL
PERSONALITY.
Sec. 3. Sovereignty, defined as the supreme power inhering in a
state (Bodin, De La Republique, I, c. 8; 1 Oppenheim, pp. 109-115),
has the internal aspect of autonomy and the external aspect of inde-
pendence.
It is essential to international personality that external sovereignty,
particularly, remain unimpaired. Half- and part-sovereign states, says
Oppenheim (Vol. I, pp. 529-530) may be parties to international nego-
tiation, but so called Colonial States, such as the Dominion of Canada,
can never be parties to international negotiation. Although Colonial
States may be fully in control of internal sovereignty (self-governing)
the absence of external sovereignty (independence) renders them in-
capable of possessing international personality. Thus viewed from the
standpoint of the law of nations, the Dominion of Canada. the Com-
monwealth of Australia, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa
are British territory. (Ibid, vol 1, p. 231.)
Yet sovereignty does not imply the boundless liberty of a state
to do whatever it likes without any restriction whatever. Membership
in the Society of Nations is itself a restriction, carrying with it rights
as well as duties, and among the duties, those to respect the independ-
ence of all other states, to grant innocent passage in its territorial
waters, to grant exterritoriality to foreign sovereigns and diplomatic
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agents, and the like. A state may impose many and extensive restric-
tions upon its freedom of action without thereby impairing the status
as an international person, as in the conclusion of treaties of alliance
and neutrality and in granting servitudes. (Oppenheim, pp. 182-183;
Hall, 7th ed., p. 23.)
EFFECTS OF NEUTRALIZATION.
Sec. 4. Restrictions connected with neutralization do not, accord-
ing to correct opinion, (1 Oppenheim, p. 179) destroy a state's inde-
pendence, although it cannot make war except in self defense, cannot
conclude treaties of alliance and is in other ways hampered in its lib-
erty of action. (Jellinek, Das Recht des mod, Staates, 461-470; Le
Fur, Etat federale, 438 ff.; 1 Merignhac, Traite, 219 ff.; Martens,
N. R. II, pp. 157, 173, 419, 740.)
Much has been written on the effect of neutralization as a limita-
tion upon the independence of the neutralized state; little upon the
effect of neutralization as a limitation upon the sovereign powers of
the guaranteeing states; yet the relation is a wholly reciprocal one.
States which solemnly pledge themselves to respect and defend the
invioliability of another, in consideration of its pledge of neutrality,
are plainly so far limited in their independence as to be legally incapable
of warring against the neutralized states during the continuance of the
validity of the obligations. And the obligations may be said to con-
tinue until there is a release by the common amicable assent of the
parties. (Declaration of London, 1871.)
EFFECT OF PROTECTION.
Sec. 5. The position of protected states cannot be defined by gen-
eral rule. Each case, differing in the degree of control exercised by
the protecting state over the international affairs of the protected state,
must be considered separately. Yet international personality is not
affected by a treaty stipulation requiring that the protected state will
never enter into a treaty with a foreign power which will impair or
tend to impair its independence. (1 Oppenheim, p. 181.)
The test lies in the degree of control over external sovereignty
reserved by the protected state; and if its subjects retain a distinct
nationality and if its relations to the protectng state are such as to be
consistent with its neutrality during a war undertaken by the protecting
state, it is an international person. (The Leucade, Spinks Admn. Prize
Cases, 1854-1856, 237; De Martens N. D. II, 663; Hertslet, 338; Hall
7th ed. pp. 27-29.)
Relations even of suzerainty and vassalage or dependence such as
those formerly existing between the Holy Roman Empire and the
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States of Germany from 1648 to 1806; and those of Napoleon to the
Confederacy of the Rhine; and those between the Ottoman Empire
and Bulgaria, Roumania and Servia, may not be a bar to international
personality in view of the limited interference with external affairs.
(Rougier, Revue, 1904, Chronique, 604 ff.; Snow, 2nd ed. p. 7.)
But if a state part with its rights of negotiation and treaty, and
lose its essential attributes of independence, it can rio longer be re-
garded as a sovereign state or as a member of the great family of
nations. (1 Phillimore, secs. 75-76; 1 Halleck, Baker's 3rd ed. p. 69.)
VICCISSITUDES OF STATS LIFZ NOT AFFECTING INURNATIONAL
PERSONALITY.
Sec. 6. Sovereign states, as members of the society of nations,
undergo mutation and accident in common with the experience of the
units in all other earthly societies; and, in response to the operation
of certain laws established in that society, states come into being, they
enjoy for a time a legal continuity of existence under vicissitudes inci-
dent to all living organisms, and they pass away.
There is a constant and gradual change in their citizens through
deaths and births, emigration and immigration. There is a frequent
change in those individuals who are at the head of the states and
there are sometimes changes in their forms of Governments, or in
their dynasties, if they are monarchies. There are sometimes changes
in their territories through loss or increase of parts thereof, and there
are sometimes changes regarding their independence, through partial
or total loss of the same. Several of these and other changes in the
condition or appearance of states as international persons, are indif-
ferent to international law, although they may be of great importance
for the inner development of the states concerned, and directly or indi-
rectly for international policy. (1 Oppenheim, sec. 76; Hall, 7th ed.,
pp. 20-22.)
Those changes, on the other hand, which are or may be of im-
portance to international law may be classified according to their
influence upon the character of the state concerned, as an international
person. (Westlake, 58-59; Despagnet, Nos. 87-88; Snow, Stockton's
2nd ed. p. 5.)
A state remains one and the same international person in spite
of changes in its headship, in its dynasty, in its form, in its rank and
title and in its territory. (1 Oppenheim, secs. 76-79), although, in re-
spect of such changes, no official intercourse is possible between states
refusing recognition and the state concerned.
While such changes-which may be effected by revolution or vio-
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lence-are not wholly indifferent to international law, they neither
affect a state as an international person nor affect the personal identity
of the state concerned. (1 Oppenheim, sec. 77; Hershey, sec. 124;
Texas vs. White, 7 Wall, 700; Keith vs. Clark, 97 U. S. 454; 1 Moore,
secs. 43-58, 120, 139.)
T MPORARY INABILITY TO GIVE EXPR SION TO SOVErIGNTY.
Sec. 7. Viewing sovereignty as an element distinct from govern-
ment and territory--the media through and upon which it is exercised
and manifested-it will be seen that a state may suffer accidents which
for a time leave it unable to give expression to its sovereignty. This
may happen:
1. From internal causes; as when:
(a) Civil strife overwhelms its government; or
2. From external causes; as when the government is set aside or
the territory temporarily controlled by another state, through:
(a) Intervention, as an act of police; or,
(b) Military occupation, as an incident to war.
In the practice of nations a temporary loss of the media through
which sovereignty is made manifest does not interrupt the continuity
of international personality. Thus France, for example, has retained
her personal identity from the time the law of nations came into
existence until the present day in spite of changes in her territory,
her dynasty and her form of government, her revolutions and her
wars of victory and defeat. (I Oppenheim, sec. 77.)
Ila. THROUGH A LOSS OF GOVERNMENT.
The science of politics has learned to distinguish between sov-
ereignty of the state and sovereignty -of the organ which exercises the
powers of the state. A state, as a juristic person, wants organs to
exercise its powers. The organ or organs which exercise for the state
powers connected with sovereignty are said to be sovereign them-
selves, yet it is obvious that this sovereignty of the organ is derived
from the sovereignty of the state. (1 Oppenheim, sec. 69.)
It may happen that the government of a state is overwhelmed by
uncontrolled internal violence, but unless the condition is long con-
tinued, taling the form of permanent anarchy, the state is not consid-
ered to have lost its international personality. Its sovereignty con-
tinues to inhere in the body of the people, although mute in the
absence of an agency through which to express itself. (Snow, Stock-
ton's 2nd. ed. p. 7.)
Other states usually maintain their legations in such state, at
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least, until a continuance involves a high degree of personal danger.
(Mexico, 1914-1916; Russia, 1917-1918.)
And their diplomatic agents usually carry on unofficial relations
with such de facto authorities as may spring up, awaiting the re-estab-
lishment of a government capable of and willing to express the sover-
eignty of the state before resuming official relations. (1 Moore, secs.
43-58; Texas vs. White, 7 Wall 700; 5 Moore, Int. Arb. 4399-4459.)
2-a. THROUGH ACTION OF INTeRVENING STATE.
Although the right of independence implies a corresponding duty
to refrain from interference in the affairs of other states, it may happen
that a state will so culpably fail in the discharge of its international
duties as to leave to states injured no alternative but acquiescence
under wrong or a resort to preventive or corrective force. Among the
most potent form of the latter is armed intervention. Regarded from
the point of view of the state intruded upon, it must always remain an
act which, if not consented to, is an act of war. But from the point
of view of the intervening state it is a measure of police, undertaken
sometimes for the express purpose of avoiding war. (Hall, 7th ed.,
sec. 88; Bluntschli, Arts. 68, 474-480; Bonfils, Nos. 295-324; Despag-
net, Nos. 193 ff.; I-leffter, secs. 44-66; 1 Merignhac 284 ff.; Vattel
IV, secs. 54-62; 1 F, de Martens, sec. 76.)
Although armed intervention may involve the existence of war
in a material sense (The Three Friends, 1896, 166 U. S. 1, and Scott,
758) unless it assume the proportions of a public war in a legal sense,
with its recognition on the part of other states by their assumption
of the rights and duties of neutrals, war is not considered to exist.
If intervention do not eventuate in legal war, it can not give rise
to the rights of war as they may affect the life of the state. The
intervening force undoubtedly has a de facto authority within the
territory effectively held; and it may perform administrative acts
which will bind the de jure government upon its return, insofar as
these acts operate within the tenure of de facto possession. (2 West-
lake, 106.)
The tenure of the intervening state is, however, wholly tempor-
ary and exclusively one of force, the justification for which ceases
with the removal of the provocative cause.
Since the permanent loss of a part of a state's territory does
not affect a state's position as an international person it necessarily
follows that a temporary sequestration incident to intervention, does
not do so. (China, 1900; Venezuela, 1904; Vera Cruz, April 21,
1914.)
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If the whole of the state's territory be occupied by an intervening
force there occurs, not a suspension of sovereignty, but rather a tem-
porary inability to give expression to sovereignty. The supreme will
inhering in the state is not destroyed, but temporarily rendered unable
to manifest itself.
In the course of such intervention other states usually continue
to exercise the right of legation, carrying on unofficial relations with
de facto authority in respect of territory controlled by it, and offi-
cial relations with the legitimate governmerit in respect of territory
still under its control. (Cuba, 1906; Mexico, 1914; Belgium, 1914-
1917.)
If the occupation of a state's territory by an intervening force
continue over a long period of time, it may, of course, result in the
extinction of the state as an international person, if its entire territory
be involved.
2-b--THROUGH CONTROL BY A MILITARY OCCUPANT.
Military occupation, as an incident to war in a legal sense, dif-
fers from military occupation, as an act of police, in that while the
latter is a local and temporary act of force, of which other states
need take no notice, the former calls into operation the rights and
duties of belligerency, in respect of the warring states, and the rights
and duties of neutrality, in respect of all other states.
Belligerent occupation gives to the occupant the right to insti-
tute military government over so much of his enemy's territory as
he effectively holds, using as far as possible the laws in force; but
his position is that of a provisional administrator only. (Annex, Con-
vention IV, The Hague, 1907; Law Review Quarterly, Vol. XXXIII,
No. 132, p. 363-L. Oppenheim.)
During the continuance of war the occupant has only a usufruc-
tuary right, and the title of the former sovereign continues until a
treaty of peace, by its silent operation or its express provisions, ex-
tinguishes his title forever. (Wheaton, Dana's 8th ed., sec. 545;
Grotius III, Cap. 6, secs. 4-5; Vattel, III, Ch. 13, secs. 197-8; Mar-
ten III, Ch. 4, sec. 282; Kluber, secs. 254-259; Convention IV, The
Hague, Arts. 42-56.)
While in former times occupation carried with it all of the
rights of completed conquest, an occupant may no longer alienate
the territorial property of his enemy to a third state so as to entitle
it to claim against the legitimate sovereign. (Vattel, III, Ch. 13,
sec. 198.)
Insofar as a state's territory is thus occupied, and to that extent,
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there is a limitation upon its ability to give expression to its sover-
eignty; but the limitation is territorial only; and it in no manner
limits its legal powers in respect of its territory not ocupied. (2
Oppenheim, sec. 169.)
If military occupation become co-extensive with the territorial
limits of the state there results a corresponding inability to express
its sovereignty as to its entire territory. It cannot be held that sov-
ereignty itself is suspended without a denial of the settled principle
that the legal title to the territory continues to inhere in the legitimate
sovereign until conquest is followed by annexation, cession or long
continued adverse possession.
The legitimate sovereign's title can be extinguished in no other
way; and the act of session, following conquest, involves a universal
admission that the ceding sovereign had, up to the time of that act,
a legal title, however extensively his territory may have been occu-
pied.
And if the occupant be expelled, his administrative acts, carried
out in accordance with the laws of war and the existing local law,
must be adopted; but the occupant's acts can have no legal force be-
yond his tenure. (2 Westlake, 106; Wheaton, Dana's 8th ed., p.
421, N.; Phillirnore, III, sees. 568-574; Heffter, sees. 188; Blunt-
schli, sec. 731; Calvo, sec. 3182.)
The inhabitants do not owe the occupant obedience under inter-
national law, but under martial law only; because he will crush them
if they are not obedient. (Law Quarterly Review, XXXIII, p. 368,
L. Oppenheim.)
There is not an atom of sovereignty in the occupant, says Oppen-
heim (Supra), since it is now generally recognized that the sov-
ereignty of the legitimate government, although it can not be exer-
cised, is in no way diminished by mere military occupation.
EFFECTS OF GUARANTOR'S USE OF FORCE AGAINST A NEUTRALIZED STATE.
Sec. 8. From remote ages states going to war have striven to
spare their own territories as far as possible, even if to do so involved
making neutral territory the battle ground. The fresh instance of
this in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 moved the Hague Con-
ference of 1907 to make a declaration on the subject (Convention V.)
which, having been universally subscribed to and ratified, became
a settled principle of international law.
Among other things, the convention, embodying the declaration,
sets out that the territory of neutrals is inviolable; and that the fact
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that a neutral state repels by force an attempt to violate its territory
can not be regarded as a hostile act. (Art. 10.)
Thus states are forbidden to violate neutral territory and neu-
trals are recognized as having a right to resist such violations without
thereby being considered legally at war.
An invading state may nevertheless legalize its entry into a neu-
tral state, however, by a formal declaration of war.
Yet it may happen, that the invaded state is not only neutral
but neutralized. (I Martens, N. R. 11, p. 379; XI, p. 390, and XV-I,
p. 790; Hertslet, 1 B. and M. 232 N.), in which situation it not only
has the right to repel an attack upon its territory but may be under
a solemn duty to do so; (Art. VII, Treaty of London, 1831; Bel-
gium) having undertaken the duty of remaining neutral under all
circumstances, it acquires the right to have its neutrality respected.
(Baty and Morgan, War and its Conduct, p. 231.)
If a state not a party to the guarantee declare war upon a neu-
tralized state, a legal state of war would arise. The state not a party
to the treaty of neutralization, is, of course, not bound by the con-
tracts of others.
But the situation is quite different where a state, seeking to make
war upon a neutralized state, is a party to the treaty of neutraliza-
tion; as between them, in view of their mutual obligations, war is
legally impossible. There may be military violence and all of the
accompaniments of war in the material sense, but the legal rights of
a belligerent can not accrue to the guaranteeing state. It is a tres-
passer ab initio.
Nor can a declaration of war issued by the guarantor bring a
legal state of war into existence. (Germany, Declaration against
Belgium, Aug. 4, 1914.)
And in view of the treaty obligations of a neutralized state, it is
doubtful that a counter declaration of war could create a legal con-
dition of war; for it is an essential principle of the law of nations
that no power can liberate itself from the engagements of a treaty,
nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the consent of the
other contracting powers. (Declaration of London. 1871 ; Hertslet,
Map of Europe by Treaty, 1256-7, 1892-8, 1904.)
It follows, with respect to the invading guaranteeing state, since
none of the rights of war accrue to it, that all destruction committed,
all requisitions, contributions and fines levied, and all other of its mil-
itary acts, are wholly outside the protection of the law.
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SUSPENSION OF INDEPENDENCE A CONTRADICTION OF TZRMS.
Sec. 9. The case of Holland during the period of Napoleonic as-
cendency is cited (I Moore, sec. 79, and Int. Arb. 4473-4476) as an in-
stance of "Suspension of independence." During the period Holland
had not only been subjected by arms, but had been rendered an en-
forced abettor of France, with a King of the Napoleonic family, Louis,
placed upon the throne; and in 1810 by the decree of Rambouillet,
Holland was declared formally united to the empire.
The abandonment of the claims of the United States against the
Netherlands on account of acts of France within Dutch territory, was
proper, not only, as the Dutch government argued, because the Neth-
erlands were under the actual government of France (1 Moa.re, sec.
79), but also because the acts complained of were the acts of a mil-
itary occupant in excess of his authority as such, and necessarily ren-
dering his government liable.
To admit of the legal possibility of a "suspension of indepen-
dence"--independence and sovereignty being synonymous--involves a
denial of the entire modern doctrine of military occupation, with its
limitation of the occupant to the position of a mere administrator, and
legitimate sovereign's continuing title to the territory, as a corollary
Whether the enemy overrun a part or the whole of the territory en-
larges in no way the occupant's authority. And the only effect of
more extensive occupation in respect of the legitimate sovereign is to
diminish, not his sovereignty, but the territory within which the exer-
cise of that sovereignty would otherwise be unobstructed.
It must be accepted as a sound proposition of logic, as well as of
law, that title to property can not inhere in a person whose being is
suspended. And to say that a suspension of sovereignty occurs in
any case short of completed conquest involves further-since the
occupant can have no title--a recognition that the territory becomes
res or territorium nullius, after the obsolete conception of the Roman
law (Wheaton, Dana's 8th ed., p. 432, n.), and therefore open to the
first occupant.. (Westlake, 137-155; Oppenheim, sec. 220.)
But the modern development of the law, with respect to territory,
has been wholly contrary to the theory of conquest as a means of
acquiring title. (P. Fiore, Nouveau droit international public, 2nd
ed.; traduit de L'Italien par C. Antoine, 3 vols., Paris, 1880, sec.
1696; Bluntschli, Das. Mod. Volkerrecht, C. Lardy, Paris, 1895, sec.
286; Calvo, Le droit international theorique et pratique, Paris, 196,
2 Gallison, 485; U. S. vs. Rice, 4 Wheaton, 246; Minutes, Int. Am.
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Con. 1889-1890, pp. 789-806; 1 Moore, p. 292; Phillipson, Termina-
tion of War, etc., pp. 29-31.)
MUTATIONS OF STATES AND THEIR EFFECTS UPON TREATIES.
Sec. 10. Whether or not, and to what extent the vicissitudes of
state life affect the binding force of treaties and the ability of a state
to negotiate new treaties must be determined by the applicable rule
of law in the light of the peculiar facts in each case.
EXTINCTION OF STATES AND SUCCESSION.
A. If a state cease to exist as an international person. its treat-
ies, which the exception of those that are transitory or dispositive,
necessarily lapse, though where the rights of third parties are con-
cerned there may be a succession. (I Westlake, pp. 67-75; U. S. vs.
Proileau, 1866, 2 H. and M. 563, and Scott, Cases, 85, King of the
Two Sicilas vs. Wilcox, 1851, Sim. N. S. 301, 327-363, as to suc-
cession see Despagnet, Nos. 86-102; 1 Piedelieore, No. 148; Rivier,
pp. 72 if; Bluntschli, Arts. 46-61 ; Bonfils, Nos. 214-233.)
EFFECT OF OUTBREAK OF WAR.
B. A respectable number-perhaps a majority-of the authori-
ties hold that all treaties, with the exception of those contemplating
war or a permanent condition of things, are annulled as between bel-
ligerents from the outbreak of war. (I Kent, Com. 177; 3 Philli-
more, sec. 530; 1 Twiss, sec. 252; Lord Stowell, The Frau Ilsabe
1801, 4 C. Rob. 64. See Contra: 1 Hallick, p. 242; Riquelme, Der.
Pub. Int. liv. I tit. 1 Chap. XV; Hall, sec. 125; Woolsey, sec. 160; II
Pradier-Fodere, sec. 1215; Dana's Wheaton, sec. 275, n. p. 143; II
Oppenheim, sec. 99; I. F. L. Annuaire, XXIV, 1911, pp. 201-13,
220-221.)
Although there is lack of agreement as to what classes of treat-
ies-are suspended or annulled by war, there is agreement that treat-
ies granting privileges are abrogated. (Snow, Int. Law, p. 99.)
TEMPORARY INABILITY TO EXECUTE.
C. But those events in state life which merely temporarily ren-
der a state unable to execute its treaties, whether from internal or
external causes, do not ordinarily affect their continuing validity.
(1 Oppenheim, p. 577; Snow, Stockton's ed., pp. 6-7; quoting Kent
and Hall.)
STATES UNDER PROTECTION.
D. If a state becomes subordinated to another or enters a con-
federation of which the constitution is inconsistent with liberty of
action in regard to the subject matter of its treaties, such treaties nec-
"'-- -0. It is an implied condition to their continuing obliga-
Washington University Open Scholarship
MUTATIONS IN STATES
tion, that tie parties to such compacts shall keep their freedom of will
with respect to the subject matter, except insofar as the treaty is
itself a restraint upon liberty. (Hall, 7th ed., p. 369; Bluntschli, sec.
459; Kluber, sec. 164; Heffter, sec. 98; Wheaton, Dana, sec. 275.)
THE EPC o1 VIOLATION ON LAW-WORKING TRnATIZS.
Sec. 11. Multi-partite compacts, in the nature of international
law-making treaties-in the absence of stipulation as to the time and
manner of their termination-are dissolved only by the consent of the
parties. Thus a violation of a treaty of neutralization by one of the
guarantors does not have the effect of releasing the violator from
the obligation of the treaty nor does it affect the continuing validity
of the treaty. (Declaration of London, 1871, supra.)
COM, ENCEc OF OCCUPIED STAMEs.
Sec. 12. As to the competence of a state to conclude a treaty
while part of its territory is occupied by an enemy, there is no ques-
tion of its legal capacity, if it have a government representing the will
of the nation. There is no diminution of sovereignty involved in the
temporary or permanent loss of part of a state's territory. Even
where the whole of a state's territory is thus temporally lost it may
not be properly contended that a loss of sovereignty occurs until the
state ceases to exist through completed conquest. Until that time the
legitimate sovereign is dispossessed of his territory; at that time he
is divested of his title. (2 Westlake, 106; L. Oppenheim, L. Q. R.
Vol. XXXIII., No. 132, p. 363.)
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